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Building on work by Sims (1988) and Chung (1990), Sargent (1999) studied a setting in
which adaptation within an approximating Phillips curve model causes recurrent escapes
fromthetime-consistentoutcomeofKydlandandPrescott(1977).Betteroutcomesemerge











Figure 1: Moving average of monthly C.P.I. inﬂation, all items.
because the government temporarily has learned the natural rate hypothesis. The escapes
occur via a remarkable type of dynamics reﬂecting accidental experimentation induced by
the government’s adaptive algorithm and its imperfect model. By focusing on a manage-
able special case, thispaper obtains analytical characterizations of thoseescapedynamics.1
Figure 1 shows the inﬂation rate in the U.S. consumer price index after World War II. It
displays a rise in the late 1960’s and 1970’s, with a dramatic stabilization under Volcker
around 1980, then a further reduction under Greenspan in the early 1990’s.
We want to think about these data in terms of a model with the following features:
(1) the monetary authority controls the inﬂation rate, apart from a random disturbance;
(2) the true data generating mechanism embodies a version of the natural rate hypothe-
sis embedded within an expectational Phillips curve; and (3) as in Kydland and Prescott
(1977), a purposefulgovernmentdislikesinﬂation and unemploymentand a private sector
forecasts inﬂation optimally. An innovation of this paper is to add: (4) that the monetary
policy makers don’t know the true data generating mechanism but use a good ﬁtting ap-
proximating model.
Within modelswith features (1), (2), and (3), thereare twoapproaches to explaining the
data in Figure 1. The ﬁrst is the hypothesis of Parkin (1993) and Ireland (1997) that move-
mentsin thefundamentals of the basic Kydland-Prescottmodelcaused thetime-consistent
inﬂation rate to vary over time, and that observed inﬂation tracked these movements.
Parkin and Ireland assume ﬁxed preferences and ﬁxed beliefs for the policy authority and
the public, but a shifting natural rate of unemployment.
The second approach posits that while the data from the 1970’s may have tracked the
time consistent inﬂation rate, after the early 1980’s the monetary authorities chose inﬂa-
1Since we completed this paper, we have received Williams (1999), which manages to compute the domi-
nant escape route for a closely related model. Williams slightly modiﬁes the learning algorithm by ignoring
the
R term below in order to simplify the analysis. He is able to obtain a diffusion approximation and to
numerically minimize a version of the action functional to be described below. The dominant escape route
computed by Williams closely resembles the one computed here.
6                                                                                                              ECB Working Paper No 23 l  June 2000 tion below the time consistent rate. Some papers (e.g., Ball (1995)) have formalized this
view in terms of particular speciﬁcations of history-dependentstrategies for the monetary
authoritiesthatencodereputations. Others(e.g.,McCallum (1995) andBlinder(1998)) sug-
gest that the American monetary authorities have somehow, through unspeciﬁed means,
managed to commit themselves to a better than time consistent inﬂation rate.
This paper contributes another theory within second approach. We hold ﬁxed the fun-
damentals in the economy, including the true data generating mechanism, preferences,
and agents’ methods for constructing behavior rules. Changes in the government’s beliefs
about the Phillips curve, and how it approximates the natural rate hypothesis, drive the
inﬂation rate. Inspired by econometric work about approximating models by Sims (1972)
and White (1982), we endow the monetary authority, not with the correct model, but with
an approximating model that it neverthelessestimates with good econometric procedures.
We use the concept of a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, a natural equilibrium concept
for behavior induced by an approximating model. Among the objects determined by a
self-conﬁrming equilibrium are theparametersof thegovernment’sapproximating model.
While the self-conﬁrming equilibrium concept differs formally from a Nash (or time con-
sistent) equilibrium,2 it happens that the self-conﬁrming equilibrium outcomes are the
time-consistent ones. Thus, the time consistent outcome continues to be our benchmark.
Like a Nash equilibrium, a self-conﬁrming equilibrium is stated in terms of population
objects (mathematical expectations, not sample means). We add adaptation by requiring
the government to estimate its model from historical data in real time. We form an adap-
tive model by having the monetary authority adjust its behavior rule in light of the latest
model estimates. Thus, we attribute ‘anticipated utility’ behavior (see Kreps (1998)) to the
monetary authority. Following Sims (1988), we study a ‘constant gain’ estimation algo-
rithm that discounts past observations. Called a ‘tracking algorithm’, it is useful when
parameter drift is suspected (see e.g. Marcet and Nicolini (1997)).
Results from the literature on least squares learning (e.g., Marcet and Sargent (1989),
Woodford (1990), Evans and Honkapohja (1998)) apply and take us part way, but only
part way, to our goal. The literature shows how the limiting behavior of systems with
least squares learning is governed by a deterministic dynamics, described by an ordinary
differential equationandknownas‘mean dynamics’. Theseresultsimply thattheadaptive
system with least squares learning converges to the self-conﬁrming equilibrium and the
time consistent outcome. We go beyond the previous literature on least squares learning
and discover another deterministic component of the dynamics that governs the system
undertheconstantgain algorithm. Thesearethe‘escape’dynamics. Theypointaway from
the self-conﬁrming equilibrium and toward the Ramsey (or optimal-under-commitment)
equilibrium outcome. So two sorts of dynamics dominate the behavior of the adaptive
system.
1. The mean dynamics come from an unconditional moment condition, the least squares
normal equations. These dynamics drive the system toward a self-conﬁrming equi-
librium.
2It is deﬁned in terms of different objects.
ECB Working Paper No 23 l  June 2000                                                                                                                7 2. The escape route dynamics propel the system away from a self-conﬁrming equilibrium.
Theyemergefromthesameleastsquaresmomentconditions,buttheyareconditioned
on a particular “most likely” unusual event, deﬁned in terms of the disturbance se-
quence. This most likely unusual event is endogenous.
Under least squares adaptation without discounting of past observations, the mean
dynamics dominate in the limit. They make the system converge to a self-conﬁrming equi-
librium. Under the adaptive system with constant gain, the escape route dynamics endure
and occasionally drive the system toward the optimal (time inconsistent) outcome.
The escape route dynamics have a compelling behavioral interpretation. Within the
conﬁnes of its approximate model, learning the natural rate hypothesis requires that the
government generate a sufﬁciently wide range of inﬂation experiments. To learn even an
imperfect version of the natural rate hypothesis, the government must experiment more
thanitdoeswithintheconﬁnesofaself-conﬁrmingequilibrium. Thegovernmentiscaught
in an experimentation trap. With a constant gain, the adaptive algorithm occasionally puts
enough movement into the government’s beliefs to produce informative experiments.
1.1 Simpliﬁcations
Sargent (1999) studied these matters within the context of the distributed lag speciﬁcation
of the Phillips curve used in empirical applications. To simplify the approximation and
control issues, this paper conﬁnes itself to a context in which the government estimates a
static Phillips curve. This is the setting studied by Sims (1988). A cost of this simpliﬁcation
is that it eliminates important points about the “induction hypothesis” of Cho and Matsui
(1995) and howdistributedlag speciﬁcationsof thePhillips curvecan approximatethenat-
ural rate theory under particular experiments. A beneﬁt is how the current setting illumi-
nates the role of induced experimentation in promoting escapes from the time-consistent
equilibria.
1.2 Related literature
Evans and Honkapohja (1993) investigated a model with multiple self-conﬁrming equilib-
ria having different rates of inﬂation. When agents learn through a recursive least squares
algorithm, outcomes converge to a self-conﬁrming equilibrium that is stable under the
learning algorithm. Whenagentsusea ﬁxedgainalgorithm, EvansandHonkapohja(1993)
demonstrated that the outcome oscillates among different locally stable self-conﬁrming
equilibria. They suggestedthat such a model can explain wide ﬂuctuations of market out-
comes in response to small shocks.
In models like Evans and Honkapohja (1993), the time spent in a neighborhood of a lo-
cally stable equilibrium and the escape path from its basin of attraction are determined by
a large deviation property of the recursive algorithm. As the stochastic perturbation dis-
appears, the outcome stays in a neighborhood of a particular locally stable self-conﬁrming
equilibrium (exponentially) longer than the others. This observation provided Kandori,
8                                                                                                                 ECB Working Paper No 23 l  June 2000 Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) with a way to select a unique equilibrium in
evolutionary models with multiple locally stable Nash equilibria.
An important difference from the preceding literature is that our model has a unique
self-conﬁrming equilibrium. Despite that, the dynamics of the model resemble those for
models with multiple equilibria such as Evans and Honkapohja (1993). With multiple
locally stable equilibria, outcomes escape from the basin of attraction of a locally stable
outcometotheneighborhoodofanotherlocally stableequilibrium. Thefact thatourmodel
has a globally unique stable equilibrium creates an additional challenge for us, namely, to
characterize themostlikely direction of theescapefrom a neighborhoodof the uniqueself-
conﬁrming equilibrium. Aswe shall see,the mostlikely direction entails thegovernment’s
learning a good, but not self-conﬁrming, approximation to the natural rate hypothesis.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of this paper focuses on a learning mechanism that facilitates sufﬁcient ex-
perimentation occasionally to offset the strong forces driving an adaptive system toward
the pessimistic Kydland-Prescotttime consistent equilibrium. Section 2 describes the basic
setting. Section 3 deﬁnes and computes the Nash equilibrium and the Ramsey outcome.
Section 4 deﬁnes a self-conﬁrming equilibrium and shows how it supports a Nash out-
come. Section 5 describes a minimal modiﬁcation of a self-conﬁrming equilibrium formed
by giving the government an adaptive algorithm for its beliefs. In section 6, using sim-
ulations, we study how and why adaptation facilitates experimentation and escapes to
better than time-consistent outcomes. Section 7 offers an economic interpretation of the
escape path. Section 8 specializes the setting to multinomial shocks, for the sake of ana-
lytic tractability. In section 9, we formally examine the asymptotic properties of the escape
path by investigating the large deviation properties of the underlying recursive learning
algorithm. Section 10 discusses a more general setting and concludes. A ﬁnal appendix
gives a brief post World War II pictorial history of the U.S. Phillips curve.
2 Setup
We start with a framework and an idea of Sims (1988). We use Sims’s version of Kydland
and Prescott’s model of a time-consistent government inﬂation policy and restate it in lan-
guage used by Stokey(1989). First we form two rational expectations equilibria (Nash and
Ramsey). Then we formulate a version of the model called a self-conﬁrming equilibrium.
Here the government uses an approximating model. After that, we describe our main in-
terest, an adaptive version of the model in which the government ﬁts its approximating















) denote the unemployment rate, the inﬂation rate, the systematic part
of the inﬂation rate, and the public’s expected rate of inﬂation, respectively. The govern-
ment sets
x
t, the public sets
^
x








ECB Working Paper No 23 l  June 2000                                                                                                                92.1 The Private Economy




































































￿ is the natural rate of un-
employment and
￿
￿ is the slope of an expectations-augmented Phillips curve. According
to (2.1), there is a family of Phillips curves indexed by
^
x
t. Condition (2.2) states that the
government sets inﬂation up to a random term
v
2
t. Condition (2.3) imposes rational ex-
pectations for the public. System (2.1), (2.2), (2.3) embodies the natural unemployment
rate hypothesis: surprise inﬂation lowers the unemployment rate but anticipated inﬂation
does not.
2.2 The government’s purpose





















3 Equilibria with knowledge of model
The literature focuses on two equilibria that arise from assuming that the government
knows the correct model. Called the Nash equilibrium and the Ramsey plan, they come
from different timing protocols. The outcome with a Ramsey plan is better than that for a
Nash equilibrium. This is the time inconsistency problem.
To deﬁne a Nash equilibrium, we need















































































Deﬁnition 3.3 The Ramsey plan
x
t solves the problem of minimizing (3.5) subject to (2.1), (2.2),











































































t. The addition of constraint (2.3) to the government’s problem in the
Ramsey plan makes the government achieve better outcomes by taking into account how
its actions affect the public’s expectations. The superiority of the Ramsey outcome reﬂects
the value to the government of being able to commit to a policy before the public sets its
expectations. This is how Kydland and Prescott (1977) reached the pessimistic conclusion
that a benevolent and knowledgeable government would set inﬂation too high because it
makes decisions sequentially, not once-and-for-all time.
4 Equilibrium with an approximating model
Following Sims (1988), we now study a setting where the government does not know the
structure and makes policy with an econometric model that approximates the economy.
This leads to a model with two models within, one the true model (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), the
other the government’s econometric model.

















t is a random variable orthogonal to the constant and
y
t, which makes (4.8) a re-
gression equation. Speciﬁcation (4.8) ignores the hidden state
^
x
t that truly positions the














E is the mathematical expectation operator; (4.9) identiﬁes
￿ as a population least
squares regression vector. Equation (2.2) continues to express the government’s belief that
it can control
y
t up to a random term.
4.1 The government’s decision problem




































































It maps an approximating Phillips curve





Deﬁnition 4.2 A self-conﬁrming equilibrium is a government belief
￿, a government pseudo
best response map for
x














) such that: (a) the
stochastic process satisﬁes (2.1), (2.2), (2.3); (b)
x
t satisﬁes (4.12); (c) the regression coefﬁcients
￿
satisfy (4.9).
Condition (a) requires that the data are generated by the true model and that the pub-
lic’s expectations are rational. Condition (b) requires that the government set the system-
atic part of inﬂation to be a pseudo best response to its beliefs about the Phillips curve.
Condition (c) requires that the government’s beliefs about the Phillips curve be consistent
with the data.
Proposition 4.3 The self-conﬁrming equilibrium outcome equals the Nash outcome.
Proof: We proceed by constructing the self-conﬁrming equilibrium outcome and compar-
ingittotheNashoutcome. Tocomputeaself-conﬁrmingequilibrium, substituterule(4.12)





















Equating coefﬁcients in (4.13) and (4.8) and rearranging gives



























This equals the setting for
x
t under a Nash equilibrium. Q.E.D.















Figure 2: Nash and Ramsey outcomes and best response expansion path.
Within a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, the moment matrix of the variables on the right













































￿ is evaluated at self-conﬁrming equilibrium values (4.14), (4.15).
4.3 Source of suboptimality
In the self-conﬁrming equilibrium, the government’s approximating model correctly cap-




t, although it fails to iden-
tify the role of the expected inﬂation rate
^
x
t in positioning the Phillips curve. See ﬁgure
2, adapted from Kydland and Prescott (1977). In a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, the esti-
mated Phillips curve coincides with the true Phillips curve evaluated at the Nash equi-
librium value of expected inﬂation. The effects of expected inﬂation
^








t are constant in the self-conﬁrming equilibrium, the fail-
ure to identify
^
x as a shifter costs the government nothing in terms of statistical ﬁt. The
self-conﬁrming equilibrium is suboptimal because the Nash equilibrium is suboptimal.
It is useful to ﬁnd the parameter values that would induce the government to imple-




0. From the pseudo-best response map (4.12), the








0 : it must believe that the Phillips
curve is vertical. But the Phillips curve is not vertical in a self-conﬁrming equilibrium.
The empirical Phillips curve (4.8) would be approximately vertical had the government






t randomly over a sufﬁciently wide set of
values. However, within a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, the government and the public set














5 An adaptive system
Following Sims (1988), we now make a minimal modiﬁcation of the preceding model of






1, and instead endow the government with a recursive al-
gorithm for estimating those parameters from historical data. The recursive estimation
algorithm is a version of least squares. Each period, the government sets
x
t by substi-
tuting its most recent estimate of
￿ into its behavior rule (4.12). Thus, we posit that the
government behaves each period as though its estimate of
￿ were known and permanent,
even though it updates that estimate in responseto new data.3 This leads to an anticipated
utility model (Kreps (1997)) for the government. The speciﬁcation generates data from a






















telltheprivatesectorthegovernment’sbehaviorrule.4 Augmenting(2.1), (2.2), (2.3), (5.18),
(4.12) with an adaptive formula for
￿
t completes the model. We express the learning rule
for














































































g is a sequence of positive real numbers and
R







. The second term on the right of (5.19) is a weighting matrix times the time
t value of the least squares orthogonality condition for the government’s Phillips curve
￿.
The algorithm adjusts
￿ in a direction to make the orthogonality condition hold, not on






1 recovers a version of least squares.





t. Compared to least
squares, an algorithm with a constant
a discounts past observations.
















































3The government does not experiment intentionally, and does not proceed as advocated by Wieland (1997).
4We would get similar data patterns if we instead gave the private sector agents their own recursive algo-
rithm for forecasting inﬂation with a gain parameter equal to the government’s.

















































































) summarize the government’s beliefs.
6 An associated o.d.e. and mean dynamics
The analysis of convergence of least squares in self-referential systems in Marcet and Sar-
gent (1989) and Woodford (1990) rests on results from stochastic approximation theory.
They approximate the limiting behavior of the stochastic system with an o.d.e. This paper
will extend this analysis by ﬁnding another o.d.e. that governs expulsions away from a
self-conﬁrming equilibrium.
































































































































) is the residual
￿ in the government’s Phillips curve (4.8). When we drop
time subscripts, we shall mean the continuous time counterpart of the variables in the








































































) is from (4.17). This is the associated o.d.e. used by Marcet and Sargent (1989)
and Woodford (1990) to analyze related models. The o.d.e. (6.29) is derived by taking






), the term multiplying
a
t in (6.26). The o.d.e. (6.30) is

















￿ associated with a self-conﬁrming equilibrium. Let
R
s be the
associated ﬁxed point of (6.30).
5Later we shall ﬁnd other o.d.e.’s derived by averaging the shocks in (6.26) with respect to other distribu-
tions.
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The right side of (6.29) incorporates three aspects of the model: (1) the time
t value of the
least squares orthogonality conditions for the government’s estimator of
￿; (2) the gov-
ernment’s pseudo-best response in setting
^
x
t as a function of
￿; and (3) the true Phillips
curve and inﬂation generating mechanism (2.1), (2.2), (2.3). Together, these form a differ-
ential equation whose right side, when equated to zero, can be interpreted as a set of un-
conditional moment restrictions that determines a self-conﬁrming equilibrium. The mean
dynamics are interesting because they determine the limiting behavior of the stochastic
discrete time algorithm when
a
t eventually behaves as
1
t, as it does under least squares.
More precisely, by applying results of Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Woodford (1990), we
can show that if the gain
a












s with probability 1. We
summarize this in
Proposition 6.1 If the adaptive system under least squares converges, it converges almost surely
to a self-conﬁrming equilibrium. Further, because the mean dynamics are globally stable, global
convergence obtains once the algorithm is modiﬁed to prevent it from wandering outside a given
neighborhood of the self-conﬁrming equilibrium.
Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (1998) describe conditions on
the recursive algorithm that sufﬁce. The crudest of these is borrowed from Ljung (1977)










To sustain outcomes other than the self-conﬁrming equilibrium outcome in the limit,
we must arrest Proposition 6.1. We shall do so in an economical way that retains the basic
spirit of least squares learning in self-referential models.
Thus, the idea behind least squares learning (e.g., Evans and Honkapohja (1999)) is to
endow agents with a statistical model that might be “wrong” during a transition, but that
has a chance of eventually being “correct” should convergence occur. Typically, the reason
that agents’ models are wrong during transitions is that they are ﬁxed-coefﬁcient models,
while agents’ estimation procedures and behaviors in the aggregate cause the coefﬁcients
in truth to drift. Eventually, however, things may settle down so that the ﬁxed-coefﬁcients
assumption becomes correct. The problem posed by Bray (1982) was to establish con-
vergence to a correct (i.e., rational expectations) speciﬁcation of a particular sequence of
incorrect speciﬁcations induced by least squares learning. The mean dynamics are a good







t speciﬁcation implicitly embodies the ﬁxed-coefﬁcient misspeciﬁcation of
least squares. During a transition, an agent would improve forecasts were he to copy
practitioners who, when confronted with drifting coefﬁcients, discount past observations.
Discounting makes sense if the model being estimated has coefﬁcients that are random
walks. In particular, there is a Bayesian formulation of Gaussian random walk coefﬁcients
that leads to a constant gain algorithm. See Sargent (1999).




















6.2 Simulations: evidence for another o.d.e.
In the next section, we present some simulations that show the mean dynamics at work
but that also indicate another nearly deterministic kind of dynamics. This other source of
dynamics looks like it is solving some o.d.e., but not the mean dynamics. The rest of the
paper seeks this other o.d.e. The source of this o.d.e. must be the original system (5.21),
(5.22), (5.23), (5.24), (5.25). We shall see that the new o.d.e. comes from the same moment
conditions as the mean dynamics, with expectations being conditioned on an endogenous
sequence of unusual shocks.
6.3 Simulations









1. We will display some simulations that show the workings of two distinct
sources of dynamics: the mean dynamics associated with (6.29), and some “escape route
dynamics” that are activated when the government engages in enough experimentation to
make it learn (too strong) a version of the natural rate hypothesis.
The simulations are from a version of the algorithm (5.21), (5.22), (5.23), (5.24), (5.25).




















































0 . There is a unique self-conﬁrming equilibrium,












Figures4 and 5 display aspectsof thetwosimulations. Themean inﬂation ratein a self-
conﬁrming equilibrium is
5. Themean inﬂation in theRamseyequilibrium is
0. Noticethat
from (4.12), the government would set the systematic part of inﬂation at the Ramsey level
of





We initiated each simulation from a self-conﬁrming equilibrium andseta constantgain













































. The simulations show:






heads toward a self-conﬁrming equilibrium. This reﬂects the workings of the usual
Woodford-Marcet-Sargent convergence theorems. For
￿
2 small (as we have set it),






















































0. This explains why most of the points near the
parabola cluster slightly underneath the parabola.
2. There are occasional recurrent rapid movements away from a self-conﬁrming equi-
librium toward a neighborhoodof the Ramsey inﬂation outcome. Theserapid move-










2 away from a self-conﬁrming equilibrium. They take another shorter (in some









3. The sample variance of the estimated parameter
￿
1 typically grows along the dy-
namic path heading toward the self-conﬁrming equilibrium, then collapses during
the escape to near Ramsey.
6.4 The escape route








3, we ran many simulations to
learn more about the escape route. We used the simulations to estimate the distribution of
escaperoutesandthetimetoﬁrstescape. Startingfroma self-conﬁrmingequilibrium, each
simulation runs for a random number of periods. The stopping time for a simulation was















) to the neighborhood of the Ramsey outcome and the number of periods
that elapse from the beginning of the simulation to the event that the government’s beliefs
prompt it to enter the prescribed neighborhood of the Ramsey outcome. Figures 6 and 7
describe these statistics for large numbers of simulated paths. Figure 6 plots 500 escape
paths, and Figure 7 plots the histogram of ﬁrst passage time to the neighborhood of the
Ramsey for 5000 sample paths. We plot only 500 escape paths to contain the size of the
6See Appendix B to chapter 8 of Sargent (1999) for the connection between
a and a discount parameter in a
loss function.












































escape route and mean dynamics














































escape route and mean dynamics























The scatter path of escape route, N = 500








postscript ﬁle that generates the graph. With 5000 points, the escape route graph is only
a little thicker and centered on the same route. For the sample of 5000 sample paths, the








2 and a median of
3
8.
Other simulations with lower constant values of
a reveal the same escape route but
have distributions of escapetimes to the Ramsey neighborhoodthat are shifted to the right
relative to Figure 7.
The striking feature of Figure 6 is how tightly bunched are the paths of beliefs moving
from the vicinity of the self-conﬁrming equilibrium to the neighborhood of Ramsey. This
reﬂects the “near determinism” that Whittle (1996) tells us about escape route dynamics.
We can summarize the dynamics of escapes to Ramsey in the following rough phrase:
escapes to Ramsey are unusual events; but given that they occur, with high probability
they occur nearly along the most likely path.7 We explain this mysterious phrase in the
context of the special case that
v
i





2.8 But ﬁrst we brieﬂy interpret the
escapes from the self-conﬁrming equilibrium in terms of the behavior of the government.
7 Escaping the experimentation trap
The striking feature of the simulations is the large and rapid departures from the self-
conﬁrming equilibrium that always approach the Ramsey outcome along a common es-
cape route. Noticehow the slopecoefﬁcients gorapidly nearly to zero duringthe stabiliza-
tion. What prompts the stabilizations is a chance process through which the government
7We are paraphrasing Michael Harrison’s verbal account of one of the two fundamental results of large
deviation theory.
8Forbinomialshockswehaveobtainedsimulationsthatarequalitativelythesameasthosereportedabove.










Histogram of first passage time, N = 5000
First Passage time
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government doesn’t distinguish between surprise and anticipated inﬂation).
In a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, the government is in an experimentation trap. Within
the conﬁnes of the government’s approximating model, detecting the natural rate hypoth-
esis requires that there be sufﬁcient dispersion in the public’s expected rate of inﬂation.
But within a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, there is no variation in the expected rate of in-
ﬂation because the government does not vary its setting of the systematic part of inﬂation
x
t. Though the outcome is the same, the structure of this expectations trap differs from
the one in Kydland and Prescott’s time consistent equilibrium. Here the government fails
to generate the range of experiments needed to detect the natural rate hypothesis within
its approximating model. But only if it detects something approximating the natural rate
hypothesis will it want to generate those experiments.
The escape route has the government generating those experiments because its doubts
leave it open enough occasionally to experiment and to learn. The experiments are initi-
ated by some unusual shock patterns that we shall analyze in detail below. The escapes to
near the Ramsey outcome are accompanied by endogenous experimentation. Any force















) plane) the estimated Phillips curve (4.8).
Through (4.12), any steepening of the Phillips curve causes the government to lower inﬂa-
tion, generatinginﬂuential observations to steepenthe Phillips curve further. Overweight-
ing recent observations helps this process along. This reinforcing process comes to a halt
when the estimated Phillips curve (4.8) becomes vertical. The system cannot remain at the
Ramsey outcome forever, because there is in truth a short-run Phillips curve that the gov-
ernment will discover and begin to exploit, rekindling the mean dynamics that drive the
system toward the Nash outcome.
The simulations indicate that there is another nearly deterministic component of the
dynamics that supplements the mean dynamics. We now seek them in a special case that
permits us to get our arms around the escape route.
The explanation in terms of endogenous experimentation will be strengthened and
formalized by the analysis of the following section where we ﬁnd an o.d.e. that describes
the escape route.
8 Binomial shocks































We proceed by studying in detail the structure of the orthogonality conditions that deﬁne
self-conﬁrming equilibrium and, what is the same thing, a ﬁxed point of the government’s







) as the residual in the



































where themathematical expectationis taken with respectto theunconditional distribution
of
v
t. The mean dynamics for













The escape dynamics occur when thealgorithm is driven by a particular unusual sequence
of
v
t’s. An associated o.d.e. that describes them comes from replacing
E in (8.32) with an























































t be the determinant of
R














































































































































g consists of two pairs of
linearly dependent vectors, each pair being indexed by one of the two possible values for
v
2































for each realization of
v








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9: Stable solution
￿















) with the boundary func-
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9.1 Introduction
Weproceedby studyingthedynamics whentheamountofnoiseintherecursivestochastic
system is very small.9 Roughly speaking, as the noise in the recursive stochastic system
disappears, the asymptotic behavior of the recursive algorithm can be approximated by
the mean dynamics. Since the mean dynamics of the recursive system converges to the
stable point, it is sensible to focus on the dynamics of
￿
t around the stable point.
While the mean dynamics push
￿
t toward the stable solution of the associated ordinary
differential equation, the stochastic perturbation, albeit small, sometimes pushes
￿
t away
from the neighborhood of the stable solution. Our objective is to characterize the most
likely path that
￿
t follows while escaping from the neighborhood. We call it the dominant
escape path (Bucklew (1990)).
Let
D be an open ball around stable point of the mean dynamics
￿
s. We follow the








D. In order to distinguish the path converging to
￿
s from the path
escaping from
￿
s, we write the escape path as





























pass through different points of the boundary of
D. Consequently, associated with the
exit time is a probability distribution along the boundary of
D, induced by the probability
distribution of the escape paths. As the gain sequence
a converges to 0, however, the
probability that a particular point in
@
D becomes an exit point is completely determined
by the probability that the shortest escape paths through the point is realized. (This is the




0, the recursive system converges to a deterministic system in a probabilistic
sense and the probability distribution of exit times converges to a degenerate distribution
concentrated at the exit point of the dominant escape path. Thus, if
’ is the dominant
escape path, then for any
￿
>
0, the shortest escape paths must converge to the
￿ neigh-
borhood of
’ with probability 1 as the gain sequence






generated by a stochastic recursive algorithm converge to the mean dynamics with prob-
ability 1 over any ﬁnite time interval. As the gain sequence becomes smaller, the sample
paths accumulate in a small neighborhood of the mean dynamics so that its neighborhood
is the most likely location of a sample path. This observation suggests that the dominant
9Also known as a nearly deterministic system in Whittle (1996) or a system with small noise in Freidlinand
Wentzell (1984).
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Because the notion of an escape path is built upon a continuous time process while the
original recursive algorithm is a discrete time process, we need more notation. We shall
use
’ with various sub and superscripts to represent the escape path.





































































t, (9.35) emulates the original















) be the continuous time process

































































) the exit point.
’






















is the minimal escape time.
The exit time
￿
e is associated with a probability distribution along
@
D. To emphasize
the relationship between the exit time
￿

















’ with exit time
￿
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￿
s is the stable point of the associated o.d.e., the unconditional probability of
escaping from the neighborhood of
￿



















Therefore, in order to deﬁne the dominant escape path, we must consider the probability
distribution conditioned on
B






t is drawn from a multinomial distribution with mean 0. In order to sim-
plify notation, let us assume that the distribution of
v
i







































































































































































). One can easily verify that if





















































































To approach the boundary of
D requires a sequence of “unusual” events of
v
t, whose
probability is strictly less than 1. Thus, in order to maximize the probability of escape, the
escape path must minimize the number of “unusual” events to reach the neighborhood of







) made in each periodmustpoint in the same
direction, say toward the boundary of
D. Otherwise, some moves cancel others, wasting
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￿ along the shortest path












g must point in the same direction: the cone spanned by the vectors must be
contained in a closed half space rather than cover
<
2.

















































































































be the empirical frequency of





























































) has the multinomial distribution described in (9.37).

















































































































) are linearly independent.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The key implication of Proposition 9.3 is that along the dominant escape path, not
every
￿ in the support of
v
t can be realized with positive frequency. Hence, the maximum
number of elements in the supportof
f




In order to ﬁnd the upper bound for the number of elements in the support of
f
￿ im-






















is contained in a half space. Here, we use (9.39) and (9.40) in a crucial way.



































































































































































￿ can take as many as
4
‘












































One can repeat the same exercise for each realization of
v
t. Thus, there are as many as
4
‘






t sothat(9.44) holds. Proposition9.3 impliesthatthenumberofelementsin thesupport
of
f




Yet Proposition 9.3 admits that the support of
f








0, the sample paths generated by the stochastic algorithm (5.19)
converge to the trajectory of the mean dynamics (6.29) in probability. Following the same
logic, weprovethatthesamplepathsmustconvergetothetrajectoryofthemeandynamics
conditionedon (9.44). Forexample, if
v
i


























g with probability 1. In the binomial


































Proposition 9.4 Suppose that
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Since the dominant escape path is one of the trajectories characterized by (9.45), we
have to examine at most
4
‘
2 different trajectories induced by the different collections of
perturbations. Since we can obtain a closed form representation for the ordinary differen-




we shall ﬁrst examine the dominant escape path when
v
i











2, then Proposition 9.3 and Proposition
9.4 imply that along the dominant escape path
’ with exit time
￿







































D consists of two pairs of linearly dependent
vectors. We can select at most four pairs of linearly independent vectors, and calculate the






















g, then the associated conditional


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9.5.2 The dominant escape path
Forthebinomial case, froman inﬁnityofpossibleescapepaths,wehavenownarrowedthe
set of mostlikely paths down to four, namely, the solutions of the four o.d.e.’s(9.48), (9.49),
(9.50), (9.51). We now narrow down thepaths more. We can disposeof two of the four can-
didate escape paths easily, because they fail to escape far enough from the self-conﬁrming
equilibrium. The remaining two paths do escape far enough but do so at different rates.
The path that escapes faster is the dominating escape route. To evaluate which of thesetwo
remaining candidate escape paths escapes faster requires analyzing a pair of nonlinear or-
dinary differential equations. We do this numerically. The trajectory induced by (9.48) is
the dominant path, because along this path,
￿
t escapes from the neighborhood of
￿
s most









e. We shall verify numerically that this path passes through the
￿ associated with the Ramsey outcome. This path afﬁrms and explains the simulations.
Before turning to the numerical solutions of the o.d.e.’s, we give some local analytical
results.
9.5.3 Details
We can obtain an analytic characterization of the dominant path in a small neighborhood
of
￿

































0. Hence, for a recursive algorithm with small perturbations (a “nearly deter-



















e themselves are in the “small” neighborhood of
￿
s.
For this reason, we choose as
D a ball around
￿
















e. Then the only






































































































































e is the stable point.








s to see how quickly




































































































































































































































































































Note that the ﬁrst element of the vector in (9.56) is negative. Combining (9.54) and (9.55)




































































Proposition 9.5 There exists
￿
>













Our numerical analysis will further afﬁrm the dominance of trajectory (9.52).
9.5.4 Numerical calculation of dominant escape path
Let
￿
r be the belief vector that supports the Ramsey outcome. Figures 10 and 11 display




s and the shortest escape dynamics in the reverse direction
















1. The escape dynamics were calculated
by solving the differential equations (9.47) for our four different candidate selections of
the shocks, and then choosing the path that escaped the fastest. We shall soon compare in
detail two of these paths. But ﬁrst it is fruitful to compare ﬁgures 10 and 11 with our simu-




r that we encountered
in our simulations.













5. Notice that the escape occurs much faster for the path as-
sociated with (9.48), leading us to proclaim that it is the dominating escape route. Roughly
speaking, it is the dominating path because it takes less times – i.e., requires a shorter and
hence more likely sequence of unusual shocks – to happen.
That (9.48) yields the dominating escape path reﬂects the nonlinear dynamics associ-
ated with endogenous experimentation that occur along this path. Via the government’s
pseudo best response function, the government’s response to a change in
￿ is to alter
^
x
and thereby produce new observations that help to steepen the empirical Phillips curve.
Along the escape path determined by (9.48), this endogenous experimentation reinforces






































the effects of the unusual shocks. However, along the escape path determined by (9.49),
this endogenous experimentation works against the effects on
￿ of the unusual shock se-
quence. (It is a particular shock sequence peculiar to (9.49).) The resistance to the unusual
shock sequencecaused by the learning from the endogenousexperimentation accounts for
the slower movement along the escape route determined by (9.49).







2. In this case, as we have seen, the rest point of the o.d.e. is not the Ram-
sey value
￿
r. But we have already seen from ﬁgures 10 and 11 that the path of the o.d.e.
passes through the Ramsey value of
￿. Figure 13, which shows two snapshots of the same
path, with different time scales, shows that the move toward the Ramsey
￿ is fast, while
the subsequent move away from it is very slow. The quickness of the movement toward
Ramsey reﬂects the force in the model wherebyendogenousexperimentationinduces data
that appear to come from a vertical Phillips curve. It takes a long time (many more obser-
vations) to reﬁne the estimates so that they move to the rest point of the dominant escape
path o.d.e. The force toward Ramsey is stronger than the subsequent force toward the
ﬁxed point of the escape path o.d.e. This reﬂects what we remarked upon above, the rein-
forcement of the move toward Ramsey associated with endogenous experimentation, and
the resistance that endogenous experimentation puts to movements away from Ramsey.
The practical consequence of the slow movement of the escape path dynamics away from
Ramsey is to give ample room for the mean dynamics to push
￿ back toward the Nash
equilibrium. This point can be coaxed from ﬁgure 14, the bottom panel of which shows
the mean dynamics for
￿




mean dynamics pushing toward
￿
s appear stronger than the escape route dynamics after
the Ramsey value for
￿
1 has been passed.





















Figure 12: Top panel: the slope
￿

















5 (from equation (9.48). Bottom panel:
the slope
￿
1 along the alternative escape path (from equation (9.49)).























Figure 13: The slope
￿





















0then slowly moves to the rest point of the escape o.d.e. Note the two different time
scales.






















Figure 14: Top panel: the slope
￿

















5 (from equation (9.48). Bottom panel:
the slope
￿





















conditioned on the collections of perturbations determined by different hyperplanes in
(9.44). Let
’
i be the trajectory of (9.45) induced by the
i-th collection of perturbations.





). From the remark that follows Proposition 9.3, one can see that we
rotate the hyperplane 360 degrees to identify the most likely escape path to every possible
direction. Roughly speaking,
’
i is the most likely escape path to the
i-th direction. We are




As we admit much more general distribution, it becomes difﬁcult, if not impossible, to
derive a closedform representationof theo.d.e. thatdictatesthedominant escapepath. As



























2 for larger and larger values of
￿. For each
￿, this locus of points describe the
results of a ‘race away from Nash’ driven by different equally likely possible constellations
of unlikely sequences of shocks. The o.d.e. that departs from
￿
s fastest is the one whose
unusual sequenceof shocks is most likely to be observed,conditioning on the rare event of
a departureof a given size from
￿
s. Itis themostlikely path because it takesfewer unusual
shocks to push a given distance away from
￿
s.



















We used a simple Euler method for solving the o.d.e.’s. In practice, this meant that we













) for various values of
￿. Larger values of
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a and deterministic shock se-




the family of loci are shaped like the escape route from the simulations in ﬁgure 6. The
dominant escape path points toward Ramsey. Figure 16 shows a three-dimensional view
of the loci, where artiﬁcial time
￿ is recorded on the vertical axis.
9.7 General case
If we think of “pricing” unusual shock sequences, we can interpret the most likely escape
path as ﬁnding the cost-minimizing sequence of
v shocks that drives the government’s
beliefs beyond
D. Thus, we no longer require
v to be multinomial, only to be such that





























































































































o that minimizes (9.58) is the dominant escape path. This elegant for-
mulation characterizes how the approximating model behaves as it heads away from a
self-conﬁrming equilibrium.
Unfortunately, the characterization suffers because in general neither
H nor
L has a







H have a convenient
form, quadratic in this case.11 The intractability of
H and
L for us at this time inspired the
alternative approach using the multinomial distribution described above.
Consider a sequence of multinomial distributions for
v
t that converge to the normal
distribution. At the same time, consider a sequence of the dominant escape paths, each of
which is associated with recursive algorithm (9.35) in which
v
t has a multinomial distribu-
tion. Kushner (1984) points out that the large deviation estimates (such as the dominant
escape path) need not converge even if a sequence of distributions converges. At the same
time, Kushner (1984) establishes a sufﬁcient condition that if the
H functional associated
with a multinomial distribution converges, then the large deviation estimates of the limit








) is a smoothfunction. Thus,as themultinomial distributionconverges
to the Gaussian distribution weakly, its
H functional must converge to the
H functional
10See Williams (1999) for an analysis based on the approach described in this section.
11Even if
v






) is not distributed normally.
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v
t is normally distributed. Thus, the dominant escape path calculated for the multi-




Figure 6 reports the escape routes when
v










On the other hand, Figure 15 obtains when
v
i
t has a multinomial distribution obtained












2 grids. The remark-




curve can approximate an expectational Phillips curve and how the changing quality of
that approximation affects government policy and is affected by it. In this paper we have
assumed that the government ﬁts a static Phillips curve. This oversimpliﬁes things rel-
ative to historical macroeconometric practice, which routinely tried to detect the natural
rate hypothesis in terms of the coefﬁcients of a distributed lag Phillips curve. Sargent
(1999) studies a generalization of the model in which the government ﬁts a distributed lag
Phillips curve. This complicates both the construction of the government’s pseudo best
response mapping and how the distributed lag Phillips curve can approximate the nat-
ural rate hypothesis. Using a distributed lag Phillips curve to approximate the natural
rate hypothesis sends us back to issues that arose early in the rational expectations revolu-
tion: how econometrically to model anticipated inﬂation and how to impose invariance of
unemployment with respect to anticipated inﬂation. Before rational expectations, antici-
pated inﬂation was modeled as a distributed lag of inﬂation, often of geometric form, with
weights summing to unity. The natural unemployment rate hypothesis was formulated as
the restriction that in a regression of inﬂation on lagged inﬂation and current and lagged
unemployment, weights on lagged inﬂation should sum to one. Lucas (1972) and Sargent
(1971) showed that way of formulating the natural rate hypothesis contradicted rational
expectations, except in the special case that inﬂation has a unit root (see King and Watson
(1994)).
Despite Lucas and Sargent, many papers continued to process evidence about the nat-
ural rate hypothesisin terms of the sum of weights on inﬂation in a distributedlag Phillips
12Notice that we started with a discrete time recursive algorithm, and then build a continuous time process
by taking the linear interpolation of the discrete time process. One may wonder whether we can simplify the
analysis by considering the continuous time “limit” of our discrete time process by representing the contin-
uous time process by a diffusion process as in Freidlin and Wentzell (1984). The intuition of the law of large
numbers suggests that when the gain function
a is sufﬁciently small, then the continuous time process should
be a good approximation of the discrete time process. However, as Kushner (1984) pointed out, the large devi-
ation process of the continuous time “limit” may not be the limit of the large deviation process of the discrete
time process, unless the associated
H functional converges. While we believe that the large deviation prop-
erty calculated in this paper should prevail in the continuous time limit, the formal proof remains an open
question.
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favor it by the mid 1970’s.14
Sargent (1999) studies our system in the context of a distribution lag Phillips curve.
With the distributed lag Phillips curve, the self-conﬁrming equilibrium again producesthe
Nash outcome, and the system also recurrently visits an escape route to the Ramsey out-














t now representsthe time
t estimates of the distributed lag
Phillips curve. The estimates indicate that the adaptive algorithms gave timely advice not
to exploit the Phillips curve, and lend credibility to the vindication of econometric policy
evaluation.
But the vindication is not complete, because the mean dynamics are destined to rekin-
dle inﬂation unless the government learns a more sophisticated version of the natural rate
hypothesis.
13See Fuhrer (1995) and King and Watson (1994).
14It has recently started pointing against the natural rate again. See Solow and Taylor (1998).
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A Proof of Proposition 9.3
Let


















































































































￿ satisfy (A.60), then any permutation of the three vectors satisfy (A.60).
Proof of Lemma A.1. The sufﬁciency is straightforward, and therefore its proof is omitted.
To prove the necessity, assume (A.59).





￿ must contain at least three
elements. Suppose that the support contains exactly three elements whose cone cover the
entire
<









￿. We claim that for the
remaining element
￿


















































































































































which is a proper subset of
<

















































































































































0 follows from the same logic.




































independent. If there is
￿





￿ satisfying (A.60), then the proof of
Lemma A.1 is done.
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￿



















































































































































































































































































































































Since wehave assumedthat (A.60) is not satisﬁed,the denominatorof theabove twoequa-














































































































is minimized. Notice that the inner productmust be boundedfrom below because
￿
3 must














































































































































is contained in a half space. This contradicts to (A.59).











































































































































































































































be the mean directional vector at





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































e is the ﬁrst exit time for











D. Thus, the probability of each escape path
’




















Given an escape path
~














































































which implies that there exists an exponential gain in probability of realization of each



























), the number of sample paths converging to
^
’ may decrease. But, this decrease is










































0. We have constructed an alternative escape path, which has a neighborhood with
a higher probability of escape than the dominant escape path. This contradiction proves
the proposition.

































































































































































0, we obtain (9.47). By following a standard result of stochastic approxima-








































































































) is the interpolation error incurred between










































































































































































































































































), the sample paths are piled up around the
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Figures 17 and 18 display basic facts about the post WWII U.S. inﬂation-unemployment
correlation. The ﬁgurescontain scatter plots and regression lines of U.S. quarterly inﬂation
and unemployment rates during selected periods. Inﬂation is measured by the CPI (all
items). Unemployment is measured for white males over 20 years of age. Figure 17 plots
the cumulative scatter of points from 1954 I to the last quarter of the indicated year. Thus,

















t is inﬂation and
U
t is unemployment. Figure 18 displays scatter plots and regres-
sion lines for successive clumps of ﬁve years of data for the dates indicated.15
Figure17showshowaddingdatagraduallysteepenstheunconditionalempirical Phillips
curve. By the late 1970’s the Phillips curve was vertical. Figure 18 indicates the propensity
of the Phillips curve to shift while preserving a negative slope. Thus, with a long enough
range of historical experience, the unconditional Phillips curve seems vertical; with brief
enough historical perspectives, the Phillips curve retains its negative slope but wanders.




y) matters for our story. See King and Watson (1994) and
Sargent (1999).
















































































































































Figure 17: Cumulative scatters of C.P.I. inﬂation and white male unemployment
















































































































































Figure 18: Five year scatters of C.P.I. inﬂation and white male unemployment
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